NPMScan

io.github.salemalem/npmscan

Detect malicious or vulnerable npm packages: registry search, OSV.dev and GitHub advisory lookups

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23 tools, verified live

Pulled straight from the server with tools/list on 2026-10-17.
search_packagesread-only

Search the npm registry by name or keywords. Each result includes its current weekly/monthly download counts, dependentsCount (how many other npm packages depend on it), topPackagesRank (position among npmscan's own top-100k-by-downloads snapshot — not live, but a second independent popularity signal), and deterministic (not model-generated) popularityTier/maintenanceTier labels — a package ma

get_packageread-only

Fetch npm registry metadata for a package: latest version, install scripts (preinstall/postinstall are a key risk signal), maintainers, license, recent version history, weekly downloads, GitHub stars, TypeScript support, days since last publish, a topPackagesRank (position among npm's ~100k most-downloaded packages, from npmscan's own periodically-refreshed snapshot — not live), and a downloadTr

get_package_versionread-only

Fetch registry metadata for one exact version of a package (dependencies, install scripts, tarball) AND check that exact version against OSV.dev for known vulnerabilities — isVulnerable/highestSeverity give a direct answer, and each finding includes severity, a summary, and the fixedVersion to upgrade to. Use this to check a version pinned in a lockfile rather than the latest release. If the OSV

get_maintainer_profileread-only

Given an npm username, returns every package npm's own maintainer:<username> search index currently returns for that account (registry.npmjs.org's /-/v1/search — the public registry API has no dedicated 'list packages by maintainer' endpoint otherwise), plus precomputed aggregates: currentlyMaintainsCount (still listed as maintainer right now vs. already-revoked), totalWeeklyDownloads and totalD

query_vulnerabilitiesread-only

Query OSV.dev for known vulnerabilities affecting an npm package, optionally scoped to one exact version (e.g. to check whether a version pinned in a lockfile is safe). Returns isVulnerable and highestSeverity as a direct answer, plus each finding's severity, a plain-language summary, CVE aliases, and the fixedVersion to upgrade to — not a raw advisory dump. Also cross-checks the name/version ag

batch_query_vulnerabilitiesread-only

Check a whole npm dependency inventory against OSV.dev in one call: pass `packages: [{name, version?}]`, or raw package.json / package-lock / yarn.lock / pnpm-lock / CycloneDX / SPDX content via `content`. Large inventories are chunked automatically. Each finding has severity, summary, CVE aliases, fixedVersion and isMalware, so no per-package follow-up is needed. Before calling anything clean, r

get_latest_advisoriesread-only

Browse recently published npm security advisories and known-malicious-package findings. Three disjoint sources, selected via type: "reviewed" (default) is GitHub's curated, mostly CVE-backed advisories; "malware" is GitHub's own known-malicious-package advisories; "osv" is OSV.dev's OpenSSF malicious-packages feed, a separate dataset whose entries use MAL-/OSV ids rather than GHSA ids. None of "ma

get_cveread-only

Look up authoritative NIST NVD data for one exact CVE ID (e.g. "CVE-2026-2950"), or browse/search NVD by keyword, CVSS severity, CWE, or a publication-date range. Every result is enriched with CISA KEV status (`kev`, non-null only if this CVE is a confirmed, actively-exploited-in-the-wild vulnerability — treat that as an urgent-patch signal regardless of CVSS score) and FIRST.org EPSS (`epss`, t

analyze_install_scriptread-only

Statically scans a package's preinstall/install/postinstall/prepare lifecycle scripts AND the file(s) they reference — fetched directly from the published tarball, not just the command string in package.json — against npmscan's documented red-flags rubric (/docs/red-flags): child_process use, network calls, access to sensitive paths/env (.ssh, .aws, .npmrc, *TOKEN/*KEY), obfuscation, remote bi

analyze_transitive_dependenciesread-only

Walk one or more root packages' dependency trees (e.g. a package.json "dependencies" section) up to `maxDepth` levels (default 2, max 3) and check every resolved package@version against OSV.dev, so vulnerabilities several levels down still surface. Read `summary` first; `vulnerablePaths` answers "which of my dependencies pulled this in"; `nodes` has the full graph. npm aliases are followed (`actua

check_package_provenanceread-only

Checks whether a package version was published with npm's own Sigstore-backed publish provenance (`npm publish --provenance`), and cross-checks that provenance against reality rather than just reporting its presence. Three checks: (1) parses the SLSA build attestation (declared source repo, commit, builder identity, GitHub Actions run URL) and flags a builder that isn't GitHub-hosted, or an attest

check_maintainer_changesread-only

Reconstruct who has controlled an npm package and when, straight from the packument (each version records the maintainer list at publish time and who ran `npm publish`). Use it for the 'who controls this package, and did that change recently' question; use get_package/check_package_provenance for general health and publish integrity. Flags: 1. a maintainer added recently who then published soon a

check_maintainer_blast_radiusread-only

Given an npm username, lists the packages npm's maintainer:<username> search index returns for that account and looks for a tight cluster of packages whose latest version was published within a short rolling window of each other — the shape of a compromised-account supply-chain attack, where a stolen credential is used on every package the account can publish to within hours (e.g. the September

check_license_complianceread-only

Given a list of packages (name + optional exact version or semver range — e.g. straight from a package.json "dependencies" object) and an optional allow/deny license policy, resolves each package's declared SPDX license and reports a compliance verdict per package. Classifies every license into one of permissive/weak-copyleft/copyleft/network-copyleft/proprietary/public-domain/unknown, and under

diff_dependenciesread-only

Compare two snapshots of a package.json, package-lock.json (v1-v3), yarn.lock (classic or Berry) or pnpm-lock.yaml (e.g. before/after a PR; formats can differ) and report added, removed and changed packages. Lockfiles cover the full resolved graph, so transitive-only changes are caught; npm aliases are followed (`actualName`). Up to 100 added/changed packages are checked in detail. Ideal for a CI

prioritize_remediationread-only

Rank vulnerability findings other tools already returned (batch_query_vulnerabilities, query_vulnerabilities, analyze_transitive_dependencies, diff_dependencies...) by what to fix first. Pass up to 200 `{packageName, cveId?, severity?, advisoryId?, currentVersion?, fixedVersion?, findingType?}`. Each gets a tier: remove-now / patch-now / patch-soon / scheduled / monitor. How the tier is decided:

simulate_dependency_upgraderead-only

Before running npm install, check whether upgrading a package from a current to a target version is safe. Pass `packageName` + `currentVersion` + `targetVersion` (omit target for "latest"), or `packages: [...]` (1-100) to check many in one call; a name that cannot be resolved comes back with `fetchError` instead of failing the batch. A natural follow-up to prioritize_remediation: pass its packageN

suggest_alternativeread-only

Given a package that looks deprecated, vulnerable, abandoned, or suspicious, suggest better-maintained alternatives in the same category. This tool first checks the source package's own latest-version health (deprecation, latest-version OSV verdict, popularity/maintenance tiers, typosquat flag), then combines maintainer-provided deprecation hints with deterministic npm search-based category matchi

compare_packagesread-only

Compare 2-5 candidate packages for the same job (e.g. "axios vs got vs node-fetch") side by side and get a deterministic pick. More than 5 names is rejected, never truncated; duplicate names are rejected. Use search_packages first if you have no shortlist. Per candidate: downloads and trend, popularity/maintenance tiers, GitHub stars, TypeScript support, license, deprecation, latest-version vulne

audit_github_repositoryread-only

Audit a GitHub repository's npm dependencies from its URL — no pasted files needed. Fetches package.json plus the first lockfile found (pnpm-lock.yaml, then package-lock.json, then yarn.lock) from the default branch (or `ref`), and detects monorepos (package.json workspaces, pnpm-workspace.yaml), merging member dependencies (up to 50 members). What it checks: - Every lockfile entry (up to 3,000

get_remediation_playbookread-only

Maps a finding's `rule` value from analyze_install_script, check_maintainer_changes, or check_package_provenance to the matching human-authored incident-response playbook (the same content published at /docs/playbooks) and returns its concrete, ordered steps, severity tier, real-incident references, and prevention tips — not just a link. Pass the exact `rule` string(s) a prior finding already re

generate_sbomread-only

Given the same inputs batch_query_vulnerabilities accepts — either a flat {packages:[...]} list, or raw package.json / lockfile / CycloneDX JSON / SPDX JSON content via `content` — emits a spec-valid CycloneDX 1.6 or SPDX 2.3 JSON document (pick with `format`, default 'cyclonedx') with npmscan's own OSV.dev vulnerability findings and registry license data embedded in each spec's native fields:

enrich_npm_auditread-only

Given the raw output of `npm audit --json` (npm 7+'s `{vulnerabilities: {...}}` format, or legacy npm 6's `{advisories: {...}}`), parses it directly — no need to re-paste package.json/lockfile content — and runs it through the same remove-now/patch-now/patch-soon/scheduled/monitor ranking prioritize_remediation exposes for hand-built finding lists (an advisory that is malware — a MAL-* id, o

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